

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 AMMAN 1271

FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, PFOR, JO, US
SUBJECT: APRIL 1977 JMC CONFERENCE

REF: SECDEF 250008Z FEB 77 FROM ASD/ISA

1. WE RECOGNIZE PROBLEMS RAISED BY REFTEL STEM FROM GENUINE CONCERN ABOUT DIFFICULTIES WHICH HOLDING APRIL 1977 JMC WOULD CAUSE FOR DOD AND NEW ADMINISTRATION. IN PARTICULAR WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT JORDAN'S FINANCIAL PROBLEMS. HOWEVER, GIVEN PRESENT ATMOSPHERE IN OUR POLITICAL RELATIONS, WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD CAUSE SERIOUS, INDEED OVERWHELMING DIFFICULTIES, IF WE WERE TO SUGGEST NOT HOLDING APRIL 77 JMC. KING IS ALREADY BADLY STUNG BY WASHINGTON POST STORY. THE ROOT OF HIS CONCERN IS WHETHER OR NOT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION EXPECTS TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN ITS BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH JORDAN. THE SECRETARY'S VISIT HELPED TO ALLAY SOME OF THESE CONCERNS. HOWEVER CONTINUING REPETITION OF STORIES ATTACKING THE KING PERSONALLY IN THE UNITED STATES PRESENTLY HAS REVIVED THE SPECTRE OF POSSIBLE POLITICAL CHANGES IN THE OFFING FOR THE JORDANIANS. AS A RESULT, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IT
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IS CONCEIVABLE TO CHANGE HOLDING THE JMC AS A POLITICAL FACT. TO DO SO WOULD BE TO CONVEY A POLITICAL STANCE WHICH WOULD BE DELETERIOUS IN THE EXTREME TO OUR RELATIONSHIP.

2. HOWEVER WE ARE VERY MUCH CONCERNED ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH HOLDING A JMC WILL CAUSE THE

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT AND THE WASHINGTON MILITARY COMMUNITY IN GENERAL. THE JORDANIANS KNOW AND UNDERSTAND THAT WE ARE OURSELVES REVIEWING WORLDWIDE ASSISTANCE AND ARMS SALES POLICIES AND PEACE-MAKING STRATEGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAVE A LONG HISTORY OF RELATIONSHIPS DEDICATED TO MOVING THE JORDANIANS IN THEIR MILITARY PLANNING AND ACTIVITIES ALONG A TRACK WHICH WE CONSIDER WILL BE HIGHLY COMPATIBLE WITH THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY OFFICIALS OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION OF WHICH WE ARE ALREADY AWARE. IN THIS CONNECTION THE FOLLOWING ARE PERTINENT:

(A) WE HAVE LONG URGED THE JORDANIANS TO PREPARE A COMPLETE FIVE-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR JAF. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO THEM THAT THE PRODUCTION OF ANOTHER EQUIPMENT LIST-MODERNIZATION PROGRAM WOULD NOT SERVE THEIR INTERESTS. CINC JAF PROMISED IN WASHINGTON IN OCTOBER 1976 TO HAVE THE PLAN READY IN JANUARY 1977. THE PLAN HAS BEEN FINISHED AND IS BEING TRANSLATED FOR PRESENTATION AT THE SPRING JMC. OUR JOINT WORK AT THIS MISSION AND IN DOD HAS FORCED THEM TO FOCUS ON PRIORITIES FOR MANPOWER AND FUNDING FOR THE NEXT FIVE YEARS. WE FEEL THIS IS A SIGNIFICANT MILESTONE IN OUR JOINT INTERESTS IN OUR ATTEMPT TO MODERATE JORDANIAN APPETITIES IN MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT AREAS. THE PLAN SHOULD BE PRESENTED AND CRITIQUED AT THE JMC AND INsofar AS IT MEETS OUR EXPECTATIONS, JORDANIANS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO PROCEED. WHERE THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT GAPS OR AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT, THEY SHOULD BE QUIETLY POINTED OUT. CONFIDENTIAL

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JORDANIANS KNOW THAT NO ONE AT THE JMC MEETING CAN MAKE A COMMITMENT TO FULFILL JAF'S PLANNED OBJECTIVES.

(B) TRADITIONALLY THE HOLDING OF THE JMC HAS BEEN AN INDUCEMENT TO JAF TO BRING ITS FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS UP TO DATE. CINC JAF HAS TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THIS IS HIS CURRENT INTENTION. IF OUR LATEST INFORMATION IS CORRECT, JAF WILL SHORTLY TRANSFER \$15 MILLION TO DOD TO COVER ALL BACK DEBTS, EXCLUSIVE OF THOSE TO BE FUNDED ON FY 76 FMSCR. JORDANIANS ALSO BELIEVE THAT IF THEY CANNOT GAIN THIRD PARTY SIGNATURE TO CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS, THEY WILL SOON BE REQUIRED COMPLETELY TO RESTRUCTURE THEIR FY 77 GA PROGRAM TO ALLEVIATE THEIR FINANCIAL CONDITION. THEREFORE, IF THIRD PARTY GUARANTEES ARE NOT FORTHCOMING BY THE TIME OF JMC, WE WOULD INVITE INSTRUCTIONS FROM STATE AND DEFENSE TO TELL THE JORDANIANS THAT AT THE JMC THEY WILL BE EXPECTED TO CARRY OUT THIS RESTRUCTURING.

(C) THE JORDANIANS ARE NOW AWARE OF FY 78 LEVELS

AS SUBMITTED TO THE CONGRESS. THEY UNDERSTAND THAT THE CONGRESS OFTEN MAKES CUTS. NEVERTHELESS A REVIEW OF THEIR PROPOSED GA AND FMS PROGRAMS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THESE LEVELS WOULD IN NO WAY COMMIT THE ADMINISTRATION. IT WOULD, HOWEVER, PERMIT A USEFUL US JORDANIAN REVIEW. PRIMARILY, DOD INTEREST SHOULD FOCUS ON THE APPROPRIATENESS OF INDIVIDUAL LINE ITEMS AND CURRENT PRICE AND AVAILABILITY DATA.

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3. OTHER THAN ABOVE, WE AGREE THAT THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT ISSUES TO DISCUSS AT THE JMC. HOWEVER, JORDANIANS HAVE ALWAYS CONSIDERED JMC TO BE A COURT-OF-LAST-RESORT FOR ARMY AND AIR FORCE ISSUES AND ITEMS WHICH THEY CONSIDERED TO BE INAPPROPRIATELY CONCLUDED THROUGH CABLE TRAFFIC OR FOR WHICH RESPONSES HAVE BEEN DELAYED. JORDANIANS HAVE GENERALLY CONSIDERED JMC MEETINGS TO BE HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL AND GO AWAY REASONABLY SATISFIED. FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE WE DO NOT CONSIDER THIS TOO HIGH A PRICE TO PAY FOR OUR HIGHEST GRANT AID RECIPIENT AND A LONG-TIME POLITICAL ALLY AND FRIEND OF THE UNITED STATES.

4. NEVERTHELESS WE ARE DEEPLY CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THAT THE JMC DOES REQUIRE, AS PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED, A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION FROM NUMEROUS SENIOR DOD OFFICIALS. WE BELIEVE IT COULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY RESTRUCTURED TO ATTEMPT TO REDUCE THIS BURDEN AND STREAMLINE PROCEEDINGS. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT SUCH A RESTRUCTURING AND FORMAT WOULD EFFECT THE POLITICALLY IMPORTANT QUESTION WHICH IS THE FACT OF HOLDING THE JMC, NOT ITS ORGANIZATIONAL MODALITIES.

5. WHILE WE HAVE NOT YET CONSULTED WITH JAF REGARDING
A PROPOSED AGENDA, ON THE BASIS OF OUR OWN KNOWLEDGE
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OF WHAT THEY ARE LIKELY TO RAISE, WE BELIEVE THAT VERY
SHORT OPENING AND CLOSING PLENARY SESSIONS WOULD
SUFFICE WITH ONE WORKING SESSION EACH FOR DSAA, ARMY
AND USAF. ALLOWING FOR ADEQUATE TIME LAPSES BETWEEN
WORKING SESSIONS AND THE FINAL PLENARY, WE BELIEVE
MOST OF THE PROBLEMS LIKELY TO BE RAISED COULD BE
SETTLED IN THE INTERIM.

6. IN ADDITION, WE EXPECT CINC JAF WILL ACCOMPANY
KING ON HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES AND IS LIKELY
TO WISH TO COME A WEEK OR SO IN ADVANCE IN ANY EVENT.
HIS PRINCIPAL PURPOSES WILL BE TO MEET INDIVIDUALLY
WITH KEY DOD PERSONNEL. WE DO NOT SEE ANY EASY WAY
OF DISCOURAGING THIS INTENTION, AND IT IS ONLY LIKELY
TO BE REINFORCED ON HIS PART SHOULD WE SUGGEST CAN-
CELLING JMC FOR APRIL 77. BIN SHAKER, AS YOU KNOW,
HAS ALWAYS BEEN RELIED UPON BY THE KING AS A CLOSE
ADVISOR AND STRONG PERSONAL FRIEND. HIS TWO PRINCIPAL
ASSISTANTS DURING THE VISIT ARE LIKELY TO BE MAJOR
GENERAL MAJALI, ACS (OPERATINGS/PLANNING) AND MAJOR
GENERAL KURDI (COMMANDER RJAF). FOR LATTER IT WILL
BE FIRST VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES IN HIS CAPACITY
AS AIR FORCE COMMANDER.

7. IN SUM OUR MAJOR REASONS FOR HOLDING JMC AT
THIS POINT ARE POLITICAL. THERE ARE SOME COMPELLING
MILITARY PURPOSES ALSO TO BE CONSIDERED. WE WILL
DO ALL POSSIBLE TO TRY TO SHIFT FOCUS TO REDUCE IN-
VOLVEMENT OF SENIOR OFFICIALS, BUT IN RETROSPECT
BELIEVE SERIOUS DAMAGE TO OUR RELATIONSHIP WOULD BE
INCURRED IF SOMETHING CALLED JMC IS NOT HELD IN US
IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO KING'S PLANNED APRIL VISIT TO
WASHINGTON.
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